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Abstract
The mathematician Alexander Borovik speaks of the importance of
the ‘vertical unity’ of mathematics. By this he means to draw our at-
tention to the fact that many sophisticated mathematical concepts, even
those introduced at the cutting-edge of research, have their roots in our
most basic conceptualisations of the world. If this is so, we might expect
any truly fundamental mathematical language to detect such structural
commonalities.
It is reasonable to suppose then that the lack of philosophical interest
in such vertical unity is related to the prominence given by philosophers to
languages which do not express well such relations. In this chapter, I sug-
gest that we look beyond set theory to the newly emerging homotopy type
theory, which makes plain what there is in common between very simple
aspects of logic, arithmetic and geometry and much more sophisticated
concepts.
Key words: concept; homotopy type theory; vertical unity; arithmetic;
space; duality
1 Introduction
Studying the articulation of mathematical concepts is an important task for
philosophy, not least for making us lift our eyes above the level of proof to con-
sider the larger enterprise of doing mathematics. Where so much of the Anglo-
phone philosophical literature has dwelt on mathematical activity as essentially
a matter of proof construction, the larger top-down view of mathematics as
a tradition of intellectual enquiry, rooted many millennia in the past, is typi-
cally neglected. Even Lakatos, that pioneer of the study of conceptual change,
took proof construction and criticism to be the central motors of conceptual
development, rather than tackle larger strategic units of research. My earliest
published works in philosophy (Corfield 1997, 1998) aimed at showing the limi-
tations of this outlook by posing and attempting to answer the question of how
we might understand larger-scale activity, such as the mathematical equivalents
of the ‘research programmes’ Lakatos himself had studied in the field of natural
science.
By the time I came to write The Importance of Mathematical Conceptu-
alisation (Corfield 2001) it was with a view to direct attention towards yet
higher levels of research activity. My examination of ‘mathematical research
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programmes’ had led me to see the enormously intricate patterns of lines of in-
fluence between mathematics generated in different fields. I chose then to take
up as a case study forms of persuasive argument for the value of the concept of
‘groupoid’, since there were multiple lines of support for this concept from clus-
ters of researchers working in different fields. There was also a countervailing
current aiming to deny this value, which maintained that groupoids added little
or nothing not already to be found in the concept of ‘group’. Here then was to
be found a debate not as to the correctness of pieces of mathematical reasoning,
but one which concerned the worth of a certain extension of an existing concept.
Groupoids, it was claimed by their advocates, had certain key advantages over
groups when it came to capturing aspects of symmetry.
In the years since I wrote that piece, groupoids and their higher cousins
have been proposed as the building blocks of a new foundational programme
for mathematics, known as homotopy type theory, one which sees sets demoted
from their dominant position to become a lowly component of a larger picture.
If things work out well for this programme, it will be a great vindication of the
claims made by those who glimpsed the potency of the groupoid concept, even
if they never quite envisaged this lofty new role.
In this chapter I want to develop two theses:
1. This new foundational language, homotopy type theory, provides an im-
portant perspective from which to understand varieties of mathematical
concept.
2. Mathematics displays vertical unity, so that concepts met in elementary
and in research level mathematics are related.
Thesis 1 requires enough prefatory remarks on what is intended here by ‘va-
rieties of mathematical concept’ to warrant its own section, but I can quickly
sketch now what is meant by Thesis 2. Vertical unity is a term introduced
by the mathematician Alexander Borovik to indicate that while the continued
unfolding of mathematics at the research front appears to give rise to fiendishly
complicated ideas, the products of this research in fact never completely depart
from the kinds of concepts accessible to those with little mathematical training.
This unity, Borovik claims, means that “ ‘recreational’, ‘elementary’, ‘under-
graduate’ and ‘research’ mathematics are no more than artificial subdivisions of
a single continuous spectrum” (Borovik 2005, p. 1). Where we may take justi-
fiable delight in the ‘horizontal’ unity provided by far-flung analogies between
apparently different fields,
[t]he vertical unity of mathematics, with many simple ideas and
tricks working both at the most elementary and at rather sophis-
ticated levels, is not so frequently discussed – although it appears
to be highly relevant to the very essence of mathematics education.
(Borovik 2005, p. 10)
I cannot speak for any other than the philosophical literature in this regard, but
already this lack of attention there is interesting. I suspect that the standard
representation of mathematics through the filter of first-order logic and set the-
ory is to blame. By the time one has rendered conceptually similar pieces of
mathematics into set theory, little or no sign remains of their resemblance. We
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will see then that Thesis 1 is highly relevant to Thesis 2, since homotopy type
theory offers a more faithful representation of mathematics, enough to allow
commonality of structure to show through.
After the next section on varieties of concept, I first illustrate this vertical
unity with a case which takes its starting point from a commonality found
between elementary logic and elementary arithmetic. It transpires that the
common structure found between these domains can be seen as arising from the
first two steps in a hierarchy proposed by the homotopy type theory program. In
section 3, I return to my groupoid case study to see what further elaborations of
the concept have been made. From groupoids I then turn to the mathematical
concept of space, and show again how it has stayed true to a basic idea of
everyday map-making, representing a space through overlapping charts. I briefly
also consider the concept of duality.
2 Varieties of Concept
The term ‘concept’ itself designates a concept of course, one for which we should
not expect a neat, formal definition. It belongs in English to a cluster of terms,
including ‘idea’ and ‘notion’. Whether these are used as synonyms or as slight
variants is not easy to settle. In my book (Corfield 2003) I tended to rely overly
on the term ‘idea’, as acutely observed by the mathematician Michael Harris.
Corfield uses the same word to designate what I am calling “ideas”
(“the ideas in Hopf’s 1942 paper”, p. 200) as well as “Ideas” (“the
idea of groups”, p. 212) and something halfway between the two (the
“idea” of decomposing representations into their irreducible compo-
nents for a variety of purposes, p. 206). Elsewhere the word crops
up in connection with what mathematicians often call “philosophy,”
as in the “Langlands philosophy” (“Kronecker’s ideas” about divisi-
bility, p. 202), and in many completely unrelated conections as well.
Corfield proposes to resolve what he sees as an anomaly in Lakatos’
methodology of scientific research programmes as applied to math-
ematics by a shift of perspective from seeing a mathematical theory
as a collection of statements making truth claims, to seeing it as the
clarification and elaboration of certain central ideas (p. 181)
He sees “a kind of creative vagueness to the central idea” in each of
the four examples he offers to represent this shift of perspective; but
on my count the ideas he chooses include two ‘philosophies,” one
“Idea,” and one which is neither of these. (Harris 2008, p.16)
It is not that I believe I would have helped my case greatly by mixing things
up with the use of, say, ‘concept’. It seems to me that little is gained by
carving up this semantic space with different terms, for example, by providing
distinct, precise definitions for ‘concept’, ‘idea’ and ‘notion’. But, as Harris
suggests, there does seem to be a difference between, on the one hand, a core
constituent of the visionary outlook of a large scale research programme, like
that of Langlands, and, on the other, some stably defined kind of entity, such
as a group. There is also a difference between the ‘concept of (a) group’ and
the ‘concept of symmetry’, even if groups are the tool of choice to understand
symmetry.
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What we most need is as accurate as possible a description of mathematics as
a tradition of intellectual enquiry. Any distinctions we draw should follow those
we find in such a description. As Dudley Shapere (1987) argued, philosophers
should not look to produce descriptions of science by refining ‘metascientific’
terms, such as observation, confirmation and explanation, independently from
science itself, while the scientists go about their business, finding out about
electrons, genes and tectonic plates. What it is to be an observation, a confir-
mation or an explanation changes as science learns more about the world and
learns how to learn more effectively about the world. Similarly, it is not for
philosophers of mathematics to impose some preordained notion of mathemat-
ical concept onto an account of mathematics. Indeed, we should expect such a
‘meta-mathematical’ term to require modification as mathematics proceeds.
One way we might expect to see these changes is through our foundational
languages, especially when such a change occurs because of the demands of
the practice. Certainly one of the most important motivations for Frege’s work
on his Begriffsschrift was to allow for the isolation and formation of fruitful
concepts (Tappenden 1995). The components of first-order logic – variables,
function symbols, relation symbols, connectives and quantifiers – thus provide
a range of tools. With the rise of set theory, to these were added the resources
of the axioms of set formation. However, in recent decades doubts have grown
as to how helpful these tools have proved to be in making sense of the details
of mainstream mathematics. It has been a common observation that while
everything is in principle expressible in set theory, to carry out such expression
would provide no illumination.
With the emergence of a new foundation, homotopy type theory, there should
be many opportunities to explore its potential for concept formation. Type the-
ories have a large array of ingredients, from type formation rules, such as those
for identity types and inductive types, to introduction and elimination rules for
terms. We should be able to see then that some concepts emerge from the in-
trinsic components of the system, while others are merely expressible within it.
Type theories have very close ties with category theory (Harper 2013), which
has a greater claim to represent faithfully, if not all of mainstream mathematics,
then certainly large parts, such as algebraic geometry and algebraic topology.
Homotopy type theory takes this association further to higher category theory
(Lurie 2009a). In addition, some type theories allow for the direct expression
of ‘modalities,’ to be mentioned in section 5, which allow forms of variation,
cohesion and smoothness to be expressed. There are also linear flavours of
type theory, associated with linear algebra and quantum mechanics (Schreiber
2014). There will be intersting opportunities to find out which concepts are
deeply ingrained in such type theories.
Since it is all too easy for philosophers to be seduced into believing that
their preferred formalism is the source of all important answers, it will help to
keep us honest to pay close attention to the best thinking about concepts in
the philosophical literature, especially that tuned to scientific concepts. Mark
Wilson in Wandering Significance (2006) presents a strong case that concepts
are rarely given by neat necessary and sufficient conditions, and that they rarely
map straightforwardly onto the world. Instead, concepts are patched together
from varied parts. Different patches provide different ‘directivities’ as to ap-
plication. We tend to cover up these differences, he claims, behind ‘classical
facades’. When we come to see through such facades, Wilson argues, we ought
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not retreat to what he calls a ‘hazy holism’.
Many of Wilson’s examples come from applied mathematics and engineer-
ing, where we hear of the wandering significance of hardness, force, weight and
gearwheel. The imagery used for concept extension is mathematical: prolon-
gation, lifting, pulling back. Mathematical concepts are included too, as we
hear in his description of Dedekind’s number theoretic analogy, the largest case
study of chap. 4 of Corfield 2003. In future work I will explore whether we
might take Wilson’s mathematical imagery of concept extension more literally
when applied in mathematics itself. After all, the terms he deploys to convey
this imagery are generally spatial and may perhaps be better addressed by a
foundational system tuned to spatial notions, such as homotopy type theory.
But now we need to delve into a case study to start us off with examples of the
kinds of material we need for the theses of this chapter. Let’s then consider a
simple analogy between logic and arithmetic.
3 Addition, Multiplication and Exponentiation
When I teach an introductory course on logic to philosophy students, I like to
point out to them certain similarities between the truth tables for the logical
connectives and some simple arithmetic operations, similarities which have been
known since the nineteenth century. If we assign the values 1 to True and 0 to
False, then forming the conjunction (“and”) of two propositions, the resulting
truth value is formed very much as a product of numbers chosen from {0, 1} is
formed:
• Unless both values are 1, the product will be 0.
• Unless both truth values are True, the truth value of the conjunction will
be False.
It is natural for students then to wonder if the disjunction (“or”) of two
propositions corresponds to addition. Here things don’t appear to work out
precisely. It’s fine in the three cases where at least one of the propositions is
False, for example, ‘False or True’ is True, just as 0 + 1 = 1. But in the case of
‘True or True’, we seem to be dealing with an addition capped at 1, something
such as would result in a third glass when the contents of two other full or empty
glasses are emptied into it.
Setting to one side for the moment this deviation, the next connective usually
encountered is “implies”. A very good way of conveying to students the meaning
of an implication between two propositions, such as A→ B, is as an ‘inference
ticket’, a process taking a guarantee for the truth of A into such a guarantee for
B. Implications seem to act very much like functions. Denoting the conjunction
of A and B by A ∧B, we may further observe the analogy:
• (A ∧B)→ C is True if and only if A→ (B → C) is True.
• c(a×b) = (cb)a
We may reformulate the former as expressing the equivalence between deducing
C from the premises A and B, and deducing B implies C from the premise A.
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Now what accounts for this pleasant analogy? The idea of a proof of A→ B
as a function and its analogy to the arithmetic construction ba should bring to
mind the fact that the latter may also be interpreted as related to functions.
Indeed, ba counts the number of distinct functions from a set of size a to a set
of size b, so that, for example, there are 9 distinct functions from a set of size 2
to one of size 3.
Now we can see a closer analogy between proposition and sets, first through
a parallel between conjunction and product:
• Guarantees of the proposition A∧B can be formed from pairing together
a guarantee for A and one for B.
• Elements of the product of two sets A × B can be formed from pairing
together an element of A and one of B.
And second, there’s a parallel between implication and function space, or expo-
nential object:
• Guarantees of the proposition A→ B are ways of sending guarantees for
A to guarantees for B.
• Elements of the function space of two sets BA (or Fun(A,B)) are functions
mapping elements of A to elements of B.
This approach to logic is very much in line with the tradition of Per Martin-
Lo¨f (1984), and in philosophy with the ideas of Michael Dummett (1991). What
homotopy type theory1 does is take observations such as these not merely as an
analogy, but as the first steps of a series of levels. Propositions and sets are both
considered to be simple kinds of types. In Martin-Lo¨f style type theories, given
a type and two elements of that type, a, b : A, we can form the type of identities
between a and b, often denoted IdA(a, b). The innovation of homotopy type
theory is that this identity type is not required to be a proposition – there may
be a richer type of such identities. But we can see now how the levels bottom
out. If you give me two expressions for elements of a given set, the answer to
the question of whether or not they are the same is ‘yes’ or ‘no’. We say that
the identity type is a proposition. On the other hand, in the case of a type
which is a proposition, were we to have constructed two elements, in this case
proofs, and so know the proposition to be true, these elements could only be
equal. Here we are not distinguishing between different proofs of a proposition,
which has led some to call them ‘mere propositions.’
So taking identity types of the terms of a type decreases the type’s level,
and this may be iterated until we reach a point where the type resembles a
singleton point. For historical reasons connected to the branch of mathematics
known as homotopy theory this level is designated −2. Mere propositions are
thus of level −1, and sets of level 0. But we can find higher level types, ones for
which there may be a set of identities between two terms, or a type of identities
of yet higher level. Take the type of finite sets. For any two elements, that is,
finite sets, an element of their identity type is any map which forms a one-to-one
correspondence between the sets. In the case of large equally sized sets, there
1The term ‘Univalent Foundations’ is sometimes used synonymously, possibly with a slight
differnce of emphasis. For a textbook treatment see Univalent Foundations Program (2014).
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will be many of these correspondences. The identity type is a set. But then
there is nothing further to say about any two such identities, other than that
they are the same or different. This type of finite sets therefore has level +1,
since identity types are sets, of level 0. And so it goes on. One may have types
of infinitely high level.
An important part of Martin-Lo¨f type theory is the notion of a dependent
type, denoted x : A ` B(x) : Type. Here the type B(x) depends on an element
of A, as in Days(m) for m : Month, or Players(t) for t : Team. Two useful
constructions we can apply to these types are dependent sum and dependent
product.
• Dependent sum: ∑x:AB(x) is the collection of pairs (a, b) with a : A and
b : B(a). When A is a set and B(x) is a constant set B, this construction
amounts to the product of the sets. Likewise if A is a proposition and B(x)
is a constant proposition, B, dependent sum is the conjunction of A and
B. In general we can think of this dependent sum as sitting ‘fibred’ above
the base type A, as one might imagine the collection of league players
lined up in fibres above their team name.
• Dependent product: ∏x:AB(x), is the collection of functions, f , such that
f(a) : B(a). Such a function is picking out one element from each fibre.
When A is a set and B(x) is a constant set B, this construction amounts
to BA, the set of functions from A to B. Likewise if A is a proposition and
B(x) is a constant proposition, B, dependent product is the implication
A → B. In terms of the picture of players in fibres over their teams, an
element of the dependent product is a choice of a player from each team,
such as Captain(t).
Here then we can see how close this foundational language is to mainstream
mathematics and physics. Dependent sum and dependent product correspond
respectively to the total space and to the space of sections of fibre bundles,
which appear in gauge field theory often in the guise of principle bundles. A
fibre bundle is a form of product, but a twisted one where as we pass around the
base space, a fibre may be identified under a nontrivial equivalence. An easy
example is the Moebius strip, where an interval is given a 180 degree twist as it
is transported around a circle. Of course, for physics one needs some geometric
structure on the base space and total space. We shall see more about this in
the section 5 below.
We can now see that these constructions allow us to formulate the quantifiers
from first-order logic, at least as defined over types. So consider the case where
A is a set, and B(a) is a proposition for each a in A. Perhaps A is the set of
animals, and B(a) states that a particular animal, a, breathes. Then an element
of the dependent sum is an element a of A and a proof of B(a), so something
witnessing a breathing animal. Meanwhile an element of the dependent product
is a mapping from each a : A to a proof of B(a). There will only be such a
mapping if B(a) is true for each a. If this were the case, we would have a proof
of the universal statement ‘for all x in A, B(x)’, in our example, ‘All animals
breathe.’
Returning to the dependent sum, this is almost expressing the existential
quantifier ‘there exists x in A such that B(x)’, except that it’s gathering all
such a for which B(a) holds, or, in our case, gathering all breathing animals.
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As we have seen before in the capped addition of the Boolean truth values in
a disjunction, to treat this dependent sum as a proposition, there needs to be
a ‘truncation’ from set to proposition, so that we ask merely whether this set
is inhabited, in our case ‘Does there exist a breathing animal?’ This extra
step should be expected as existential quantification resembles forming a long
disjunction. That we don’t need to adapt for universal quantification tallies
with the straightforward form of the product of Boolean values.
What emerges from these lines of thought is that the lower levels of homotopy
type theory have contained within them: propositional logic, (typed) predicate
logic and a structural type theory. Coming from a tradition of constructive type
theory, one needs to add classical axioms if these are required, such as various
forms of excluded middle.
Before ending this section, I shall introduce a further way to think about
dependent sum and dependent product, this time as related via adjoints. Ad-
junctions are category theory’s way of dealing with something as close to an
inverse as possible when such an inverse does not necessarily exist. Then left
and right adjoints are approximations from either side.
Returning to our type theory, given a plain type, A, we can turn any type
C into one dependent on A by formulating x : A ` (A × C)(x) := C. If A
and C are sets, think of lining up a copy of C over every element of A, the
product of the two sets projecting down to the first of them, A×C → A. Now,
we can think of approximating an inverse to this process, which would need to
send A-dependent types to plain types. Such approximations, or adjoints do
indeed exist. Left adjoint to this mapping is dependent sum, and right adjoint
is dependent product. The fact that these are adjoints may be rendered as
follows, for B a type depending on A:
• HomC(
∑
x:AB,C)
∼= HomC/A(B,A× C)
• HomC(C,
∏
x:AB)
∼= HomC/A(A× C,B)
I shall not further explain this formulation except to note that we can see vertical
unity at play here here if we return once again to the logic-arithmetic analogy
from earlier in this section. Take A, B and C as finite sets, with B fibred over A,
which just amounts to a map from B to A, the elements of B fibred above their
images in A. Then taking the cardinalities of the two sides of each adjunction
above yields further recognisable arithmetic truths:
• c
∑
i bi =
∏
i c
bi
• (∏i bi)c =∏i(bi)c
So a pupil being taught that, say, 35× 75 = 215 is being exposed to the shadow
of an instance of an important adjunction, which in turn, as with all of the
discussion above of dependent sums and products, works for types up and down
the hierarchy of n-types. Here vertical unity takes on a literal meaning. These
n-types in the guise of higher groupoids we turn to next.
4 Groupoids, Identity and Symmetry
As it has turned out, my choice of concept in Corfield (2001) was a good one.
Groupoids have flourished in the intervening years, and we can now update
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their history a little to say more about the hierarchical levels of homotopy type
theory. A central case for groupoids that I discussed was their ability to cap-
ture ‘irregular’ quotients. This can be illustrated by a simple example which
I first learned from John Baez (see Baez and Dolan 2001). Consider a row of
six objects spaced evenly along a line. Inverting the line about the midpoint
identifies the objects, yielding three pairs.
There is nothing surprising here. We can take ourselves to be demonstrating
the simple mathematical fact that 6/2 = 3. Whether we take this to be three
bound pairs or three singletons matters little. Now let us do the same thing
with 5 objects. In this case the central object is unlike the others in that it will
be paired with itself.
Classes formed by the identification number three: two pairs and that odd
singleton. Here it seems we could be construed as making the evidently false
claim that 5/2 = 3. To repair this it would appear that we should have that
special central object count only for one half. Groupoids give us a way to do
precisely this.
For any group, in the mathematical sense, acting on a set, we speak of the
‘action’ of the group, and represent it by the ‘action groupoid’. Think of the
elements of the set as points or objects, and arrows going from one object to
another are labelled by group elements which send the first object to the second.
The cardinality of a groupoid is found by summing for each ‘component’, or
connected cluster of objects, the reciprocal of the size of its ‘isotopy group’,
essentially the number of arrows looping from an object to itself. In the case
of five objects above, for the object identified to itself in the middle of the row,
there are two such arrows. In this case, we have to add 1+1+ 12 =
5
2 , as desired.
Now it is a general result that whatever the group, and whatever its action on
a finite set, we will have an arithmetic identity in that the cardinality of the
action groupoid is the size of the finite set divided by the order of the group.
For the purposes of physics again we need more geometric structure, but
the basic idea of an action by a group of transformations specifying invariance
under symmetries is at work. From ‘orbifolds’, which might result from a Lie
group acting unevenly on a manifold, to the objects of field values for gauge
field theory, which need to keep track of gauge equivalences, we find we are
treating geometric forms of groupoid. If in the latter case instead we take the
simple quotient, the plain set of equivalences classes, which amounts to taking
gauge symmetries to be redundant, the physics goes wrong in some sense, in
that we can’t retain a local quantum field theory. Furthermore, in the case
of gauge equivalence we don’t just have one level of arrows between points
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or objects, but arrows between arrows and so on, representing equivalences
between gauge equivalences. And this process continues indefinitely to ‘higher’
groupoids, needed to capture the higher symmetries of string theory (Schreiber
2013). In conceptual terms the very idea of sameness or identity is being given
a much richer interpretation here (Corfield 2003, chap. 10). This is embodied
in the form of the identity types we saw in the previous section.
The action groupoid is in fact a manifestation of something we have already
seen. Indeed, in homotopy type theory, the way to express that a set, A, is
acted on by a group, G, is to write it as a dependent type ∗ : BG ` A(∗) : Type.
The type BG is a version of the group G, but where we’re taking it to be a
single object with looping arrows labelled by each group element. Applying the
dependent sum construction from the last section, we find that
∑
∗:BGA(∗) is
a type with structure that of the action groupoid, which should indicate to us
that the concept is a fundamental one.
Similarly we can form the dependent product, which in this case is composed
of the ‘fixed points’ of the action, those elements of the set left unchanged
by all elements of the group. Carrying on in this vein, we soon meet some
central constructions from the area known as ‘representation theory’, a subject
taught at the earliest at a senior undergraduate level. So it turns out that
important concepts in representation theory are just constructions in homotopy
type theory carried out in a context of symmetries, constructions which in more
basic settings are familiar logical operations. For example, the type theoretic
construction governing the formation of induced representations, typically first
met as a way of expanding an action of a subgroup to an action of the full
group, is very basic when carried out on sets and predicates. For instance,
consider the case of the set of dogs sent by the function ‘owner’ to the set of
people, each dog being assigned its (unique) owner. The equivalent of forming
an induced representation in this setting is to map any predicate of dogs to a
predicate of people, say, ‘poodle’ is sent to ‘owner of some poodle’. Again we
find this new foundational language showing us vertical unity between the topic
of an advanced undergraduate or graduate course and something the general
populace might understand.
With such little conceptual guidance provided by set theory, it’s unsurpris-
ing that we turn to the naming of concepts for illumination, even if this may
be misleading. It seems that there’s a thin line between modifying the charac-
terisation of a concept, and devising a new neighbouring concept. Sometimes
we just add an epithet to an existing term, as in imaginary number or nondif-
ferentiable function. Sometimes we modify one, such as functor from function.
However, naming choices are not strictly dictated by how things are best un-
derstood. Indeed, there is no reason to take preservation of a name as a sign
of great stability. Concerning the natural sciences, Dudley Shapere (1989) once
made the excellent point that we can be taken in by the vagaries of naming
decisions to see a larger or smaller difference than we ought. He gave the case
of ‘atom’. Because the name has been kept, we strive to find much greater
continuity than for the case of a concept which has changed similarly but been
renamed. In fact, in the early nineteenth century ‘atom’ and ‘molecule’ were
used interchangeably. Had the latter been the only term, a story of the change
from ‘molecule’ then to ‘atom’ now should involve no more of a change than we
tell now from ‘atom’ then to ‘atom’ today. It has been argued (Chang 2009)
that theories of phlogiston had comparable levels of empirical adequacy to early
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theories of oxygen, and that judgements as to the justified triumph of the latter
are largely due to its having won out historically in the early nineteenth cen-
tury. We pay the price today by having retained the poorly named oxygen, the
supposed ‘principle of acidity’.
Over time there’s an inclination to absorb the earlier term into a generalisa-
tion by dropping the epithet. Then we may need a new term to designate what
was special about the original case. Think of ‘natural’ number or ‘differentiable’
function. On the other hand, sometimes we resist such terminological change
as with ‘multivalued function’, which is still not an example of a function. This
is sometimes referred to as a ‘red herring’. In the case of groups, in the early
days of their use, Poincare´ meant by ‘group’ what we call abelian group. By
the time Brandt coined ‘groupoid’ in the 1920s, the term ‘group had the settled
usage we see today. He might quite possibly have denoted one as a ‘something
group’, rather than use the ‘-oid’ suffix. Having opted for ‘groupoid’, it was
always going to be hard to drop the suffix. Now we have higher groupoids and
their specialisation to higher groups, there is perhaps a chance to simplify the
terminology. But rather than naming policies, the important point of view pro-
vided by homotopy type theory reveals the centrality of this cluster of concepts
to a conception of mathematics based on identity and structural invariance.
5 Spaces and Duality
In this final section I would like to discuss briefly topics of two further studies
of mine (2015, forthcoming) which concern the large thematic concepts of space
and duality. A common criticism of set theory as a foundational language has
been its unnatural treatment of certain concepts, none more so than spatial ones.
Where the set theoretic approach can only look to build up a set that behaves
like a space from the dust of its points, homotopy type theory can at least build
into its basic entities something path-like in the collection of identities between
terms. But we must be careful here as
...although it is common in homotopy type theory to use terminology
borrowed from topology such as “path” and “circle”, these words
have a priori nothing to do with their topological versions which
can also be defined inside of type theory. (Shulman 2015, p. 3)
Indeed, homotopy type theory is a synthetic theory of structure, not of spaces
(Shulman forthcoming). This point can be seen clearly from the two versions
of circle available in the theory. The native one uses ‘higher inductive types’
to define a type, S, with a designated element known as its base point, base,
along with a designated identity element in IdS(base, base). It is natural to
represent this as a point with a loop which may be iterated indefinitely, just as
one might wind a string around a circular reel. This type can then be used to
do a synthetic form of algebraic topology, such as finding the type of maps from
S to itself as an intrinsic form of the fundamental group of the circle, which is
then calculated to be isomorphic to the integers (Licata and Shulman 2013).
The second approach is to define a circle as a locus of points in the plane.
This is a much more elaborate, and less intrinsic, construction in the type theory,
which first requires the construction of the reals, before forming the plane and
then the subtype of this which is the circle, in much the way one would ordinarily
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produce a circle. In the bare type theory there is no connection between these
two ‘circles’.
Intrinsic ways to define continuity or cohesiveness have therefore been sought,
and a solution recently found in the form of the addition of some ‘modalities’ to
homotopy type theory (Schreiber 2013). These are expressed using a string of
adjunctions in a way we need only hint at here. The treatment comes from an
understanding of a classic case where topological spaces and sets are conceived
as related by a series of four adjoint functors. The pair from spaces to sets send
a space (a) to the set of its connected components, as though any points con-
nected by a path had been clumped together to a point, and (b) to the set of its
points, as though any connectivity between points had been dissolved. The two
functors in reverse send a set to the spaces with that underlying set and either
the discrete or codiscrete topology, so either one applies no glue, or a maximal
glue when forming the spaces. These four functors can be composed in three
different ways to yield adjoint functors from spaces to spaces. Abstracting from
this situation, a pattern of such a triple of adjunctions gives a general way to
express how something spatial is made of parts which hold together cohesively.
Now we can relate the two circles above. One can also add in a further triple
of adjoints to allow the synthetic expression of many major constructions from
differential topology and geometry, to capture smoothness as well as continuity.
As I explain in Corfield (forthcoming), however intricate the ‘spaces’ of cur-
rent mathematics, we never leave behind the essential idea of constructing them
by gluing together specified model spaces. This is recognized by the term ‘atlas’
used for a collection of ‘charts’ which cover a manifold, but is an idea present
in the recent ‘generalized schemes’ of Jacob Lurie (2009b) and other spaces of
current geometry. This patchwork idea of spaces is perhaps a feature of our
everyday understanding of our surrounding space. It seems that when we work
out a way to walk across a city, we have something like local maps in our mind
which we can look to adjoin to provide us with a feasible route. With the ad-
dition of the modalities, homotopy type theory can express this gluing process
straightforwardly, as it can the geometric constructions needed to formulate
gauge field theories.
Finally, we turn to duality, which in some ways presents an interesting prob-
lem for Thesis 1 in that it runs in some sense orthogonal to the n-type hierarchy,
and so may fit less well with what we’ve discussed so far. That it is a pervasive
thematic mathematical concept is clear, and that it is superbly well captured
by category theory is readily established (Corfield 2015). Moreover, concerning
the vertical unity of Thesis 2, duality is certainly rooted in simple, everyday
concepts. Take a cube and join the midpoints of its adjacent faces with edges
to form an octahedron. Then do the same with an octahedron to form a cube.
The eight vertices, twelve edges and six faces of the cube are dual to the eight
faces, twelves edges and six vertices of the octohedron. We can likewise pair
the dodecahedron with the icosahedron and the tetrahedron with itself to com-
plete the platonic solids. This is an example of what is sometimes called formal
or abstract duality, where there is an exchange of kinds of entity and relations
between them.
Important pieces of mathematics then arise from relating this formal duality
with concrete duality, which arises from mappings which assign a value to pairs
of entities. Consider a simple truth theoretic pairing, where for an actor and
a film we assign a truth value depending on whether or not they appear in
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the film. For a typical range of actors and films it will be the case that the
list of films in which an actor appears determines that actor and the list of
actors in a film determines that film. In mathematics we often find perfect
pairings between two collections where it is possible to reconstruct an element
of the first collection from the values resulting by pairing it with elements of
the second collection, and vice versa. The inner product of a vector space is an
example of this situation where a vector is determined by the values given by its
inner product with a complete set of linearly independent vectors. The duality
between platonic solids can be reconsidered in this setting, relating formal and
concrete dualities.
While vertical unity is apparent within the topic of duality, stretching from
these simple examples to the very forefront of mathematical research, the issue
of how it relates to varieties of type theory is not so clear yet. Naturally, one
can reconstruct specific examples of duality in these languages, just as one can
reconstruct any mathematics within set theory, but one might expect general
aspects of such a fundamental concept to be expressible synthetically. However,
the research front is moving fast here. It appears that there is a linear version of
homotopy type theory, which captures some of the duality structures found in
the mathematics of quantum physics (Schreiber 2014), and elsewhere proposals
for an ‘adjoint logic’. It will be interesting to see how this work plays itself out.
6 Conclusion
In this chapter I set out to make the case for two theses
1. This new foundational language, homotopy type theory, provides an im-
portant perspective from which to understand varieties of mathematical
concept.
2. Mathematics displays vertical unity, so that concepts met in elementary
and in research level mathematics are related.
As I remarked, these theses are related in that the new language is often able to
reveal the commonality between elementary and advanced concepts as arising
from a single form of construction within the type theory.
At the same time, there is no claim on my part that every mathematical
concept finds its simplest expression within homotopy type theory. However,
we should see here the possibility of assessing constructions as to whether they
are intrinsic to all type theories, intrinsic to specific type theories (such as
the homotopy, modal homotopy and linear varieties), or as requiring complex
definitions within a specific type theory. The product construction, manifesting
as set product and conjunction of propositions, is a good example of a very basic
form of concept.
Eventually we may find some form of complexity measure for a concept or re-
sult which adds the complexity of a formal framework to that of the construction
of the concept or result within that framework. We should expect that what is
complicated according to one type theory may be approached more intrinsically
within another. Good examples of this are Stokes’ theorem and Noether’s the-
orem which appear highly complex in set theory, but which become near logical
results when expressed in modal homotopy type theory (Schreiber forthcoming).
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In that homotopy type theory and other type theories fare well at displaying
the reasons for vertical unity, I believe we can take this as a good indication of
their power.
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